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Yixiao Fang, “An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Fiscal Autonomy 




There is a close relationship between the revenue and expenditure assignment system and 
economic growth. Based on a literature review of the relationship between fiscal autonomy and 
economic growth, which shows that scholars have not made a consensus conclusion, the paper will 
introduce the historical process of fiscal decentralization in China since 1978, particularly as 
related to the establishment of the Tax Sharing System (TSS) in 1994. By studying the dataset of 
30 provincial units, I find that the degree of fiscal autonomy remains at a relatively lower level 
after the TSS reform. There are significant variations in the level of fiscal autonomy across regions 
and provinces. Through the pooled OLS regression analysis, it is found that a higher level of fiscal 
autonomy is positively related to economic growth.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Background and Significance  
Fiscal decentralization has long been a hot topic. As early as in the 1950s, decentralization became 
an instrument used by some countries to adjust the government structure; after the 1970s, an 
increasing number of developed countries began to implement fiscal decentralization, and even in 
France where there is a strong tradition of centralization, decentralization has also been introduced 
nationwide since the 1980s. In the mid and late 1980s, decentralization reform was widely 
conducted in the process of transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Over the 
past decades, the fiscal decentralization has become a global trend. Throughout the world, 
decentralization is a common phenomenon in both developed and developing countries (Xu, 
2006). 
 
Since the launching of open and reform policy in 1978, China has gradually established the market 
economy system and experienced rapid development. Many factors have played important roles 
in the economic growth, including rural reforms based on the household responsibility system 
agriculture production, modern enterprise management reforms with the introduction of 
incentives, price reforms, the introduction of advanced management concepts and high technology, 
and etc (Lin & Liu, 2000). Fiscal system reform also plays an indispensable role in the economic 
growth.  
 
Fiscal decentralization is an essential element in the financial relationship between the central 
government and local governments, with a focus on a certain degree of fiscal autonomy. Fiscal 
decentralization refers to the division of fiscal revenues and fiscal expenditures between the central 
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and local governments. Higher degree of fiscal autonomy indicates a more decentralized system. 
In the central government-led financial system, the central government will leave part of the fiscal 
revenue and financial expenditure rights to local governments, so local governments will have 
certain degree of autonomous authority, and they can decide their financial strategies according to 
their own actual situation of the local development (Xu, 2006). 
 
Transferring fiscal power and responsibilities to lower levels of governments is expected to 
improve the provision of local public goods and public services, thus leading to higher economic 
efficiency and more sustainable economic growth because lower levels of governments have more 
information access than the central government regarding local resource allocation and general 
public needs, so they are able to provide public services to better meet the local needs. In addition, 
as lower levels of governments are more accessible for local residents, local government officials 
will have more incentives to develop better financial strategies. However, practical experience has 
shown such high expectations are not always met. In many cases, fiscal autonomy has resulted in 
increasing inequality among different local administrative regions (Zhang & Zou, 1998; Lin & 
Liu, 2000).  
 
At present, the relationship between the level of fiscal decentralization and economic growth has 
not been agreed upon among scholars. Some scholars find they are positively related, while the 
others state the relationship is negative. As a key concept in fiscal decentralization, fiscal 
autonomy can be considered as a main standard to measure the degree of fiscal decentralization 
(DeMello, 2000). The thesis is to find the change of fiscal autonomy level and its correlation with 
local economic growth in China, and the final findings will have some implications for China’s 
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future economic reform and fiscal policies. Also, exploring the relationship between fiscal 
autonomy and economic growth is meaningful in providing China’s experience for the world. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
In general, the relationship between fiscal autonomy and economic growth remains open. Oates 
(1993) thinks that fiscal decentralization tends to play a positive role in economic growth, but the 
potential function depends on a number of important conditions. Based on a cross-country panel 
data set of 46 countries from 1970 to 1989, however, Davoodi and Zou (1998) find that the level 
of fiscal decentralization and economic growth are slightly negative correlated in general. The 
relationship seems to be negative for developing countries, but not for developed countries. 
Generally, developed countries are on average more decentralized than developing countries, 
though a higher level of fiscal autonomy does not always stand for faster economic growth.  
 
Whether fiscal autonomy is positively or negatively related to economic growth in China is an 
open-to-debate question, as different research’s conclusions vary from each other. In conclusion, 
the relationship cannot be easily regarded as positively or negatively correlated, and it depends on 
time and regional characteristics significantly.  
 
By studying the data at the provincial level from 1978 to 1992, Zhang and Zou (1998) made an in-
depth analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China 
as well as the distribution of rights between the central and local governments. They conclude that 
fiscal decentralization and economic growth are negatively correlated. The main reason for this 
result is that in developing countries, the central government has to make great commitment to a 
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large number of infrastructure construction, such as ports, railways, highways and so on, while the 
impact of these infrastructure construction on the local level is lagging behind. Therefore, in the 
early development stage, fiscal centralization is more beneficial to economic development. Yin 
(2004) also asserts that fiscal decentralization not only failed to effectively promote economic 
growth, but also exacerbated the imbalance of regional economic development. He points out the 
significance of choosing an appropriate level of fiscal autonomy – the optimal level of fiscal 
autonomy is decided by the share of central/local governments’ expenditure on physical and 
human capital. 
 
However, Ma (1997) reaches the opposite conclusion that fiscal decentralization has been 
positively contributed to the economic growth. Lin and Liu (2000) confirmed his conclusion based 
on the provincial panel data from 1970 to 1993. Unlike previous scholars, they measure the degree 
of fiscal decentralization by a marginal retention rate, which is decided by how large the part of 
the revenue increase is retained by provincial governments. 
 
Upon these completely different conclusions, some scholars reach a compromised conclusion that 
the relationship between fiscal autonomy and economic growth cannot be simply described as 
positive nor negative. According to Zhang and Gong (2005), the Tax Sharing System (TSS) 
established in 1994 largely changed the relationship between the fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth based on the panel data from 1986 to 2002. Before 1994, the relationship was 
significantly negative. Since the implementation of the Tax Sharing System (TSS) reform in 1994, 
however, the two began to gradually show a positive correlation, especially in the localities with 
higher per capita GDP. 
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1.3 Outline of the Study 
Based on previous studies, the paper tries to sort out the history of fiscal autonomy since the reform 
and opening up, then focusing on the changing degree of fiscal autonomy and the empirical study 
on the relationship between the level of fiscal autonomy and economic growth. The paper is 
divided into six chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 is an introduction chapter that mainly introduces the background and significance of the 
study, followed by literature review and the outline of the study. Chapter 2 will introduce the 
history of fiscal autonomy in China after 1980, which is divided into two stages by the 
establishment of the Tax Sharing System (TSS) in 1994. Chapter 3 is the research design section, 
which will include research questions with detailed methodology (conceptual and analytical 
frameworks) and methods for data collection and analyses. The following chapter 4 will focus on 
answering the first research question, presenting the changing level of fiscal autonomy in different 
provinces over these decades. After finding the change of fiscal autonomy level over decades and 
accompanying economic growth rate, Chapter 5 aims to find if there is a relation between fiscal 
autonomy and economic growth. This last chapter will mainly summarize the findings from former 
chapters and end with some limitations of the research.  
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Chapter 2 – History of Fiscal Autonomy in China 
Since the reform and opening policy published in 1978, there are two main fiscal reforms that 
restructured the revenue and expenditure assignment system between the central government and 
local governments: the implementation of the Fiscal Contract System in the early 1980s, and the 
Tax Sharing System reform came out in 1994 (Jing and Zou, 1999). 
 
2.1 Under the Fiscal Contract System, 1979-1993 
Before 1978, China implemented the old Centralized Fiscal System where the central government 
had absolute control over revenue collection and price decision rights for different products. 
However, as China began to shift from a planned economic system to a market economy system, 
the old unitary system was no longer the best option. The fiscal reform was driven by three 
important factors. First, with the rapid development of non-state-owned enterprises, and the 
worsening situation of inefficient and debt-ridden state-owned enterprises, the central government 
was facing the heavier national fiscal burden, so other sources of income were needed. Besides, 
the economic reform had strengthened the power of local governments, which naturally made local 
governments at all levels desire for the corresponding fiscal rights. Thirdly, it was aimed to 
encourage the local government to raise fiscal revenue and promote regional economic growth 
(Guo, 2007). 
 
The Fiscal Contract System was introduced at that time. The main idea of the Fiscal Contract 
System was that the Ministry of Finance decided what kinds of taxes to be collected, and the 
revenue would be shared by the central and provincial governments. In other words, it was a 
relatively decentralized system. The revenue was allocated into three categories: the revenue 
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belonged to the central government, the revenue belonged to provincial governments, and the part 
that would be shared between the central government and provincial governments. A portion of 
the provincial revenue would be remit to the central government, and the percentage was 
determined by the budgetary number of the provincial government and the total revenue the 
provincial government generated (Lin & Liu, 2000). 
 
In general, the Fiscal Contract System encouraged provincial governments to focus on economic 
growth, but it also had some limits. For most of the provinces, they were requested to give the 
certain portion of their revenue to the central government, regardless of the absolute volume of the 
revenue. For those places that required funds from the central government to cover their 
expenditures, they could not only receive the money for the central government, but keep 100 
percent of their gross revenue as well. Therefore, the incentives for economic growth and revenue 
increase would go down, and some provincial governments were likely to hide their revenue in 
order to pay less or request subsidies from the central government. Therefore, the revenue of the 
central government decreased quickly, and the fiscal burden became heavier. Also, the lack of 
regulations and supervision possibly led to corruption and social discontent (Guo, 2007). 
 
2.2 Under the Tax Sharing System, 1994-present 
The Tax Sharing System was introduced in 1994 which simplified the Fiscal Contract System, and 
more taxation categories were added. It divided the taxes into three types – the state-owned taxes, 
the local-owned taxes, and the state-local sharing taxes. The specific allocation of several main 
taxes between the central government and provincial governments is shown in Table 1. The central 
government also developed the Transfer Payment System which would allow under-developed 
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regions and minority regions to borrow money from the central government without any interest, 
with the aim to narrow the gap between their revenue and expenditure. Moreover, the central 
government no longer entrusted the local tax authorities to complete the tax collection. Instead, it 
established its own tax institution, and thus formed the national tax management system with two 
parallel levels: the central and local tax revenue collection management systems (Guo, 2007).  
 
Table 1 Taxes Division between the Central Government and Provincial Governments 
Taxes belong to the Central Government  
• Consumption Tax 
• Tariff Tax/ Custom Tax 
• Central Government Owned Enterprise Income 
Tax 
• Business Tax (Bank/Financial 
Services/Railway) 
Taxes belong to Provincial Governments 
• Individual Income Tax 
• Business Tax (Non-Bank/Non-Financial 
Service/Non-Railway) 
• Local Enterprise Income Tax 
• Stamp Duty 
Shared Taxes • Value Added Tax 
• Resource Tax 
• Stock Trading Tax 
Source: State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 1993 
 
Most importantly, the TSS reform made the taxation responsibilities between the central 
government and provincial governments clarified, which encourages all levels of governments to 
promote economic development, strengthen the tax collection management, and etc. With a 
substantial increase in the national fiscal revenue and the central government’s fiscal revenue, the 
fiscal deficit of the central government was greatly reduced, and the central government’s control 
over the provincial units was strengthened. Besides, the TSS reform further rationalized and 
standardized the relationship between the government and enterprises at all levels, and protected 
the legitimate rights and interests of enterprises. Although overall the TSS reform realized its pre-
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design purposes, there were still many problems. For example, the reform only focused on the 
central and provincial levels of governments, leaving the certain degree of fiscal freedom on the 
lower level, which was to ensure the success of the reform. It can be regarded as a compromise. 
Also, it gradually led to an increase on local fiscal burdens, and exacerbated the development 
imbalance among regions (Cui, 2011; Yang, 2014). 
 
2.3 Revenue Structure at the Subnational Level  
In China, when talking about the official government revenue, there are three related definitions: 
budgetary revenue, extra-budgetary revenue and consolidated revenue, which is the sum of the 
former two.  
 
Public fiscal budgetary revenue refers to the revenue collected by the government with the core of 
tax revenue. Prior to 2011, it was known as the "General Budgetary Revenue". Public fiscal 
budgetary revenue is mainly composed of tax revenue and a portion of non-tax revenue:  
1.  Local Tax Revenue 
Tax revenue refers to the fiscal revenue that is charged by the state to taxpayers by means 
of political power. Tax revenue is mandatory, fixed and unpaid. Generally speaking, tax 
revenue accounts for a majority proportion of the government revenue, which can be said 
to be the most important source of national budget funds. 
 
2.  Local Non-Tax Revenue 
In 2001, the term of the non-tax revenue first appeared in the official documents issued by 
the State Council, since when the term was used by various studies and literature. The 
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concept of the non-tax revenue is correspondent to the tax revenue, referring to the fiscal 
revenue collected through non-tax ways, e.g. fees and the use of funds,. 
 
As for extra-budgetary revenue, it used to be an unneglectable fiscal term before 2011, mainly 
including the administrative fees, fines, as well as government funds, land transfer income, lottery 
and so on. Since the extra-budgetary funds management reform in 2011, however, the category of 
the extra-budgetary revenue was cancelled, and all the revenue was integrated into the budgetary 
management. The extra-budgetary revenue became a historical statistical index.  
 
At the present, studies on the fiscal revenue generally use the budgetary revenue (Yang, 2014). 
Though the extra-budgetary revenue used to play a significant role in local level’s revenue 
structure – the ratio of the extra-budgetary revenue to the general budgetary revenue reached 
110.5% in 1992, there is no fixed specific definition of it and the categories keep changing (Holzer 
& Zhang, 2004). In order to guarantee the calculation standard is uniformed as well as the data 
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Chapter 3 - Research Design  
3.1 Research Questions  
The empirical research aims to find explanations for the following research questions: 
1. What is the changing level of fiscal decentralization in China since 1980?  
2. How is the level of fiscal decentralization related to local economic growth? 
 
3.2 Data Collection  
Data sources include China Statistical Yearbook, China Finance Yearbook and provincial 
Statistical Yearbooks for various years. All the data sources are official publications in China. The 
time period of the data selected is from 1980 to 2015. Due to the large number of missing data in 
Hong Kong/ Macau/ Taiwan areas, the paper will not include them into the discussion. Chongqing 
was established as a municipality in June 1997. Prior to that, it was under the governance of 
Sichuan Province, so the relevant economic data was included in Sichuan Province. As the data 
has been merged which would be difficult to split, and the data for two places after 1997 is more 
sufficient, the research will merge the data of Chongqing into Sichuan provincial unit to better 
facilitate the analysis. Therefore, the dataset will include 30 provincial units in total. The specific 
instructions for variable selection and data processing are as follows: 
1. The real growth rate of provincial GDP (GDP): indicating the growth rate of GDP in each 
region. It will be the dependent variable. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) represents the 
value of all final goods and services produced in a given region for a given period of time. 
As the price changes, the data for each calendar year cannot be used directly. In order to 
ensure the actual value calculation method is inconsistent, the paper will use the Indices of 
Gross Domestic Product (preceding year = 100). 
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2. The level of fiscal autonomy (FA): indicating the degree of fiscal autonomy of provincial 
governments, which is calculated by the ratio of provincial budgetary revenue to provincial 
expenditure. It is the most indispensable variable of the research. The higher the ratio, the 
higher the autonomy of the local government (Psycharis et al., 2016). 
 
Apart from the two most important variables, the paper will use a set of control variables to control 
the influence. The selection of control variables is based on the case study of China done by Zhang 
and Zou in 1998. The control variables are listed as below: 
3. The central tax rate (CTAX) and the provincial taxation rate (PTAX). The tax rates reflect 
the strength of the government's financial capacity. The central tax rate is the ratio of 
central budgetary revenue to national GDP, while the provincial tax rate is calculated as 
the ratio of budgetary tax revenue of each province to provincial GDP.  
 
4. The provincial investment rate (INV): measured by the share of investment in fixed assets 
in GDP at provincial level. The investment rate is an indispensable variable in the 
traditional growth estimation specification. 
 
5. The growth rate of the provincial labor force (L). Labor force also cannot be omitted when 
conducting an economic growth study. 
 
6. The degree of openness of the provincial economy (F): measured by the share of total 
volume of foreign trade (imports plus exports) in GDP at the provincial level. The general 
argument for including openness as a determinant of growth suggests that due to external 
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competition in the world market, more exports lead to a more efficient allocation of 
resources, while imports are the means to absorb advanced technology from developed 
economies (Zhang and Zou, 1998). 
 
7. The inflation rate (RPI): measured by the general retail price index at the provincial level 
as a proxy for the macroeconomic instability on economic growth. Inflation may have a 
positive impact on growth, as rising inflation causes people to invest more in physical 
capital and reduce their actual balance (Tobin Portfolio Transfer effect). Meanwhile, 
however, inflation has also increased the transaction costs of economic activities 
(consumption and investment) and may lead to the decline of the rate of economic growth 
(Zhang and Zou, 1998). 
 
3.3 Methodology 
Based on the literature review, and the historical introduction of finance reforms in China, the 
paper will divide the time period into two sample periods by the establishment of Tax Sharing 
System in 1994: (1) 1980 to 1993, and (2) 1994 to 2015. Also, the paper will follow the tradition 
of the existing literature to divide China into several regions to conduct the analysis. According to 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, all the provincial units are divided into four regions: the 
East Region, the North-East Region, the Central Region and the West region. In order to balance 
the number of provinces in each region, taking the level of economic and social development into 
consideration as well, the paper decided to merge the North-East region with the Central region 
(shown in Table 1), to find the trend in fiscal allocations between central and local governments, 
as well as to examine the relationship between the fiscal autonomy and the economic growth.  
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Table 2 Division of Three Economic Geographic Regions 
East Region (10) Central Region (9) West Region (11) 
Beijing Anhui Gansu 
Fujian Heilongjiang Guangxi 
Guangdong Henan Guizhou 
Hainan Hubei Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia) 
Hebei Hunan Ningxia 
Jiangsu Jiangxi Qinghai 
Shandong Jilin Shaanxi 
Shanghai Liaoning Sichuan 
Tianjin Shanxi Tibet 
Zhejiang   Xinjiang 
  Yunnan 
Source: Created by the author 
 
The paper will mainly conduct the research with the pooled OLS regression model. The regression 
model the paper will use is based on the model of Barro (1990), in the combination of the model 
conducted by Zhang and Zou in 1998, and the model used by Zhang in 2006. It is shown as below: 
 
GDPst = b0 + b1(FAst) + b2(CTAXt) + b3(PTAXst) + b4(Ist) + b5(Lst) + b6(Fst) + b7(RPIst) + est, 
 
 
Where s and t indicate province and year, respectively. GDP is the dependent variable, the real 
growth rate of provincial GDP; FA is the primary concerned variable of the study, the degree of 
fiscal autonomy; CTAX and PTAX represent the central and provincial tax rates; L is the growth 
rate of labor force; I, F, R represent the investment rate, the degree of openness, and the inflation 
rate; g refers to the error term. 
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Chapter 4 - Changing Degree of Fiscal Autonomy 
4.1 Overall Fiscal Status 
At the national level, Figure 1 shows the share of budgetary revenue/ expenditure in GDP. The 
trends of shares for both revenue and expenditure are similar, accounting for more than 25% in 
1980 (right after the implementation of reform and opening policy in 1978), then the shares 
declined continuously until the year of 1995, except for a slight increase in 1982 and 1988. After 
1995, both shares of the budgetary revenue/ expenditure started to recover gradually, reaching a 
level close to the beginning of the time period in 2015. Overall, shares of the budgetary revenue/ 
expenditure in national GDP show a U-shape, indicating the budgetary revenue/ expenditure 
declined greatly during the reform period, especially at the beginning of the reform. 
 
Figure 1 Share of Budgetary Revenue/ Expenditure Relative to GDP at National Level 
 

















































































Share of budgetarty revenue to GDP Share of budgetarty expense to GDP
  Fang | 16 
 
4.2 Changing Degree of Fiscal Autonomy from 1980 to 2015 
As stated in the previous chapter, this paper will use the ratio of provincial budgetary revenue to 
provincial budgetary expenditure to indicate the degree of fiscal autonomy of each province. The 
higher the ratio, the higher degree of fiscal autonomy the provincial unit has. The specific index 
data for each province in each year is listed as Appendix A. Here the 30 provincial units are divided 
into three regions as stated above.  
 
Figure 2 presents the different levels of fiscal autonomy in three regions, and the national average 
level of the period from 1980 to 2015. The trends of the three regions are consistent with the 
national average level during the time period. In general, the degree of fiscal autonomy remained 
at a relatively high level before the implementation of Tax Sharing System in 1994. There is a 
sudden increase from 1986 to 1987, which is consistent with the practice of the Fiscal Contract 
System at that time. In the year of TSS reform (1994), there is a sharp decline in the fiscal 
autonomy index, which may due to the result of man-made revenue/ expenditure inaccuracy on 
the eve of the TSS reform (1993). In order to gain more benefits in the reform, the provincial 
governments may factitiously change the revenue/ expenditure data, e.g. partly hide the revenue 
or add the number of expenditure, which led to the abnormal indicators of fiscal autonomy (Guo, 
2007).  
 
During the following three to four years, the level of fiscal autonomy kept increasing slightly and 
steadily. After the year of 1998, however, the fiscal autonomy index began to go down until 2002, 
followed by a rise from 2002 to 2007. Then there is a decline happened in 2008, lasting for three 
to four years, and recovered gradually. The declines in 1998 and 2008 may be the results of the 
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Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. During the financial crisis 
when China’s economy was under the pressure, the central government tended to put forward a 
proactive fiscal policy and the central government played a major role in the process, leading to 
the decrease in the level of fiscal autonomy. With the gradual economic recovery, the degree of 
fiscal autonomy increased as well. Overall, the degree of fiscal autonomy remains at a relatively 
low level after the TSS reform in 1994 as the TSS reform actually re-centralized the revenue 
collection. 
 
Figure 2 Degree of Fiscal Autonomy in Three Regions from 1980 to 2015 
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4.3 Fiscal Autonomy Variations among Provincial Units 
There are significant variations in the degree of fiscal autonomy among different provinces. Figure 
3 shows the fiscal autonomy index of all provincial units, and data points are scattered. For 
example, in the most recent year 2015, the ratio of budgetary revenue to budgetary expenditure in 
Shanghai (a coastal metropolitan area) was 0.89, ranked the highest one among all the 30 
provincial units. Beijing and Tianjin (another two coastal metropolitan areas) have the ratios up to 
0.82 and 0.83. The ratio of Jiangsu (a coastal province) is 0.83. Meanwhile, the ratio in Tibet (an 
inland autonomous region) was as low as 0.10 merely. Qinghai (also an inland province) has the 
second lowest ratio of 0.18. In other words, the wealthier provinces enjoy higher levels of fiscal 
autonomy. 
 
Figure 3 Degree of Fiscal Autonomy of 30 Provincial Units in 2015 
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The level of fiscal autonomy performs differently among three regions. Figure 2 and Table 3 both 
indicate the huge gap, especially between the East Region and the West Region. Provincial units 
in the East Region have a higher ratio than the national average, the ratio of Central Region is 
slightly lower than the national average, while the West region holds a ratio apparently below the 
national average line. In other words, provinces in the east are more fiscal decentralized and realize 
a higher level of fiscal self-sufficiency; western provincial units enjoy a lower level of fiscal 
autonomy, relying more on the intergovernmental transfers; provincial units in the Central region 
behave in the middle of the other two regions. 
 
  
  Fang | 20 
 
Table 3 Degree of Fiscal Autonomy in Three Regions from 1980 to 2015 
Year East Region Central Region West Region National Average 
1980 2.52 1.20 0.55 1.40 
1981 2.63 1.33 0.53 1.47 
1982 2.29 1.19 0.53 1.32 
1983 2.04 1.11 0.51 1.20 
1984 1.78 1.13 0.45 1.10 
1985 1.55 0.93 0.49 0.98 
1986 1.28 0.83 0.45 0.84 
1987 1.36 0.92 0.52 0.92 
1988 1.19 0.91 0.54 0.87 
1989 1.15 0.92 0.58 0.87 
1990 1.10 0.88 0.58 0.85 
1991 1.11 0.86 0.62 0.85 
1992 1.13 0.86 0.62 0.86 
1993 1.17 0.95 0.69 0.93 
1994 0.76 0.62 0.40 0.59 
1995 0.73 0.65 0.41 0.59 
1996 0.76 0.65 0.44 0.61 
1997 0.76 0.65 0.45 0.62 
1998 0.73 0.60 0.44 0.59 
1999 0.73 0.55 0.41 0.56 
2000 0.74 0.52 0.38 0.54 
2001 0.75 0.48 0.33 0.51 
2002 0.72 0.45 0.30 0.49 
2003 0.70 0.46 0.33 0.49 
2004 0.69 0.46 0.33 0.49 
2005 0.73 0.46 0.34 0.51 
2006 0.75 0.47 0.34 0.52 
2007 0.78 0.46 0.35 0.53 
2008 0.76 0.45 0.32 0.51 
2009 0.71 0.41 0.29 0.47 
2010 0.73 0.43 0.31 0.48 
2011 0.74 0.46 0.33 0.50 
2012 0.74 0.47 0.33 0.51 
2013 0.75 0.48 0.35 0.52 
2014 0.76 0.49 0.35 0.53 
2015 0.71 0.44 0.34 0.49 
Data Source: China Finance Yearbook, 1980-2016 
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Chapter 5 - Relationship between Fiscal Autonomy and Economic Growth 
The chapter will focus on the relationship between the degree of fiscal autonomy and economic 
growth. The variables selected are stated in the Chapter 3. The analysis will be divided into three 
steps: 1. general analysis over all provincial units from 1980 to 2015; 2. divide the time period by 
the establishment of TSS in 1994, and compare the results of two time periods to substantiate if 
TSS reform played a significant role; 3. divide the provincial units into three regions as stated 
above, and conduct the cross-region analysis. 
 
5.1 Analysis on all Provincial Units, 1980-2015 
First of all, the paper input all the variables to conduct the regression analysis. The real growth 
rate of GDP in each province is the dependent variable. The result of the regression is shown as 
below: 
 
Table 4 Regression Results for Fiscal Autonomy Indicators. Dependent variable: the real 
growth rate of provincial GDP (GDP), 1980-2015 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t P>|t|   
FA (Fiscal Autonomy) 1.950 0.328 5.95 0.000   
CTAX (Central Tax Rate) Omitted because of collinearity 
PTAX (Provincial Tax Rate) -32.020 3.775 -8.48 0.000   
INV (Fixed Assets Investment) 0.041 0.006 6.69 0.000   
L (Labor) 0.055 0.028 1.98 0.048   
F (Foreign Trade) 0.020 0.004 5.64 0.000   
RPI (Inflation) 0.077 0.019 4.02 0.000   
Number of obs = 1080     
F-Stat = 22.04     
Adj R-squared = 0.1048     
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After the check of collinearity, the variable of central tax rate (CTAX) should be deleted. Overall, 
the degree of fiscal autonomy turns to have a positive effect on the provincial GDP growth. The 
provincial tax has a negative, and relatively significant effect on growth, so the higher the 
provincial tax rate, the worse the impacts on economic growth. Investment in fixed assets, labor 
force, foreign trade (exports and imports) and inflation rate all perform positive but slight impacts 
on growth. 
 
5.2 Before/After the TSS Reform in 1994 
Since the TSS reform in 1994 played a significant role in the historical development of fiscal 
autonomy, the Table 5-a and Table 5-b show the impacts of the indicators on fiscal autonomy 
before and after the reform. It is shown that before TSS reform, the fiscal autonomy has a higher 
level of positive impact on economic growth, which is statistically significant, while the 
relationship between the degree of fiscal autonomy and economic growth is not statistically 
significant after the reform.  
 
It is understandable that the inflation rate did not have a statistically significant relationship with 
the economic growth before 1994, as market did not play an important role in China then. After 
the reform, the inflation started to play a positive role in economic growth. Taxes were not 
conducive to economic growth, which is consistent with the Table 4. Fixed assets investment and 
foreign trade both are positively related to the economic growth though the impacts are relatively 
slight. The labor forth tends to be positively related to the economic growth, but it is not 
statistically significant.  
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Table 5-a Regression Results for Fiscal Autonomy Indicators. Dependent variable: the real 
growth rate of provincial GDP (GDP), 1980-1993 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t P>|t|   
FA (Fiscal Autonomy) 2.054 0.559 3.67 0.000   
CTAX (Central Tax Rate) Omitted because of collinearity 
PTAX (Provincial Tax Rate) -33.395 7.173 -4.66 0.000   
INV (Fixed Assets Investment) 0.116 0.034 3.37 0.001   
L (Labor) 0.297 0.143 2.08 0.038   
F (Foreign Trade) 0.057 0.015 3.69 0.000   
RPI (Inflation) -0.017 0.044 -0.38 0.701   
Number of obs = 420     
F-Stat = 8.90     
Adj R-squared = 0.1016     
 
Table 5-b Regression Results for Fiscal Autonomy Indicators. Dependent variable: the real 
growth rate of provincial GDP (GDP), 1994-2015 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t P>|t|   
FA (Fiscal Autonomy) 0.023 0.661 0.03 0.973   
CTAX (Central Tax Rate) Omitted because of collinearity 
PTAX (Provincial Tax Rate) -31.030 4.400 -7.05 0.000   
INV (Fixed Assets Investment) 0.032 0.006 5.42 0.000   
L (Labor) 0.040 0.018 2.18 0.030   
F (Foreign Trade) 0.021 0.003 6.20 0.000   
RPI (Inflation) 0.115 0.017 6.86 0.000   
Number of obs = 660     
F-Stat = 21.89     
Adj R-squared = 0.1598     
 
 
5.3 Across-Region Analysis 
The positive relationship between the level of fiscal autonomy and economic growth is 
substantiated when conducting regression analysis across three regions. Since the numbers of 
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observations for each region are sufficient, the paper conducted the analysis within each region, 
instead of importing dummy variables.  
 
As the Table 6-a shows, the fiscal autonomy is positively related to the economic growth, which 
is statistically significant. Therefore, provinces with higher level of autonomy enjoy higher growth 
rates. In the east region, taxes play a significantly negative role, while the foreign trade and 
inflation both are positively related to the economic growth. The variables better explain the 
economic growth than the other regions. 
 
Table 6-a Regression Results for Fiscal Autonomy Indicators in the East Region. Dependent 
variable: the real growth rate of provincial GDP (GDP), 1980-2015 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t P>|t|   
FA (Fiscal Autonomy) 1.731 0.448 3.86 0.000   
CTAX (Central Tax Rate) Omitted because of collinearity 
PTAX (Provincial Tax Rate) -33.906 5.408 -6.27 0.000   
INV (Fixed Assets Investment) 0.012 0.015 0.78 0.435   
L (Labor) 0.089 0.041 2.18 0.030   
F (Foreign Trade) 0.018 0.005 3.40 0.001   
RPI (Inflation) 0.143 0.033 4.41 0.000   
Number of obs = 360     
F-Stat = 12.30     
Adj R-squared = 0.1589     
 
In the central region, the degree of fiscal autonomy has a more significant positively impact on the 
growth compared with the east region. The negative influence of taxes is extremely severe. Fixed 
assets investment also plays a slightly positive role in the growth.  
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Table 6-b Regression Results for Fiscal Autonomy Indicators in the Central Region. 
Dependent variable: the real growth rate of provincial GDP (GDP), 1980-2015 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t P>|t|   
FA (Fiscal Autonomy) 4.988 1.323 3.77 0.000   
CTAX (Central Tax Rate) Omitted because of collinearity 
PTAX (Provincial Tax Rate) -65.270 11.434 -5.71 0.000   
INV (Fixed Assets Investment) 0.057 0.013 4.35 0.000   
L (Labor) 0.089 0.055 1.60 0.111   
F (Foreign Trade) 0.009 0.026 0.35 0.723   
RPI (Inflation) 0.034 0.034 1.01 0.313   
Number of obs = 324     
F-Stat = 8.10     
Adj R-squared = 0.1165     
 
The model does not work very well in the west region as variables together only explain 4.84% of 
the economic growth. The relationship between the degree of fiscal autonomy and economic 
growth is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 6-c Regression Results for Fiscal Autonomy Indicators in the West Region. Dependent 
variable: the real growth rate of provincial GDP (GDP), 1980-2015 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t P>|t|   
FA (Fiscal Autonomy) 1.885 1.579 1.19 0.233   
CTAX (Central Tax Rate) Omitted because of collinearity 
PTAX (Provincial Tax Rate) -18.893 8.392 -2.25 0.025   
INV (Fixed Assets Investment) 0.046 0.011 4.06 0.000   
L (Labor) -0.017 0.054 -0.32 0.748   
F (Foreign Trade) 0.005 0.010 0.49 0.621   
RPI (Inflation) 0.030 0.034 1.66 0.372   
Number of obs = 396     
F-Stat = 4.35     
Adj R-squared = 0.0484     
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion  
6.1 Summary of the Findings 
The paper focuses on the fiscal autonomy in the time period of 1980 to the present in China. The 
changing degree of fiscal autonomy can be divided into two stages with the establishment of TSS 
in 1994. The TSS reform in fact re-centralized the revenue collection, so the level of fiscal 
autonomy keeps in a comparatively lower level after that. Also, provinces tend to have 
significantly different levels of fiscal autonomy. The east region has the highest level of fiscal 
autonomy, the central region ranks the second, while the west region relies on the central 
government most, which is consistent with other scholars’ finding that areas with more developed 
economy is more likely to be fiscal self-sufficient. Overall, the relationship between the degree of 
fiscal autonomy and provincial economic growth is positive.  
 
6.2 Research Limitations  
The research does have some limitations illustrated as below:  
1. First, due to the limited data sources, the paper uses the ratio of provincial budgetary 
revenue to expenditure as the only one index to indicate the degree of fiscal autonomy, 
which is not necessarily sufficient and reliable. Also, the paper did not take extra-budgetary 
data into consideration while the extra-budgetary revenue once accounted for a certain 
portion of the total revenue of provincial governments. If there are several more variables 
to establish a comprehensive evaluation system, the real degree of fiscal autonomy would 
be more accurate. 
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2. Besides, there is a large number of the factors will possibly impact the economic growth 
while the variables selected in this paper account for a limited part of the economic growth, 
which will damage the credibility of the research. It would be better if the research can 
import more related variables, making the research results more reliable. 
 
3. Also, the independent variables selected here are probably endogenous. In other words, the 
same factors that determine the dependent variable, the growth rate of GDP, also determine 
the independent variables, e.g. the provincial investment rate, and the degree of openness.  
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Appendix A – Degree of Fiscal Autonomy in Provincial Units from 1980 to 2015 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Anhui 1.22 1.34 1.30 1.10 1.03 0.89 0.77 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.86 0.59 0.74 1.02 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.66 
Beijing 3.45 3.31 2.81 2.03 1.68 1.59 1.36 1.28 1.29 1.19 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.04 1.01 0.75 0.81 0.80 
Fujian 1.02 1.02 0.83 0.70 0.82 0.82 0.77 0.83 0.81 0.88 0.83 0.89 0.89 0.97 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.12 
Gansu 1.21 1.16 0.97 0.70 0.63 0.68 0.66 0.71 0.69 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.82 0.40 0.42 0.48 0.46 
Guangdong 1.45 1.45 1.32 1.23 1.06 1.08 0.96 1.03 0.93 0.97 0.87 0.97 1.01 1.05 0.72 0.73 0.80 0.80 
Guangxi 0.71 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.58 0.68 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.89 0.50 0.57 0.58 0.58 
Guizhou 0.53 0.48 0.51 0.58 0.53 0.62 0.56 0.68 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.80 0.78 0.84 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.51 
Hainan 0.57 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.67 0.54 0.39 0.44 0.52 0.45 0.42 0.48 0.59 0.60 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.65 
Hebei 1.23 1.46 1.23 1.29 1.09 1.08 0.95 1.08 0.96 0.98 0.93 0.99 1.00 1.01 0.59 0.63 0.65 0.65 
Heilongjiang 0.66 0.60 0.62 0.70 0.74 0.84 0.77 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.87 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.64 
Henan 1.19 1.32 1.12 1.21 1.07 0.99 0.79 0.97 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.66 
Hubei 1.28 1.56 1.43 1.43 1.33 1.15 0.99 1.07 1.01 0.98 0.92 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.56 0.61 0.63 0.63 
Hunan 1.26 1.47 1.30 1.16 1.09 0.98 0.88 0.97 0.87 0.93 0.88 0.91 0.94 0.97 0.57 0.62 0.60 0.59 
Jiangsu 2.16 2.65 2.70 2.28 1.95 1.76 1.49 1.58 1.45 1.37 1.35 1.12 1.21 1.35 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.72 
Jiangxi 0.78 0.94 0.79 0.77 0.68 0.71 0.66 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.74 0.72 0.80 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.88 
Jilin 0.83 0.68 0.69 0.73 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.71 0.79 0.71 0.77 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.49 
Liaoning 2.55 2.91 2.47 1.89 2.63 1.50 1.31 1.34 1.22 1.17 1.06 1.07 1.02 1.18 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Neimeng 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.39 0.36 0.43 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.59 0.54 0.64 0.39 0.43 0.45 0.51 
Ningxia 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.42 
Qinghai 0.28 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.42 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.30 
Shaanxi 0.86 0.82 0.78 0.77 0.67 0.74 0.68 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.83 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.58 
Shandong 1.60 2.01 1.67 1.56 1.38 1.32 0.91 0.97 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.97 0.96 1.03 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.72 
Shanghai 9.11 9.15 8.12 6.98 5.41 4.00 3.04 3.14 2.45 2.28 2.25 2.04 1.95 1.87 0.89 0.85 0.84 0.82 
Shanxi 1.07 1.13 0.97 1.01 0.91 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.95 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.96 0.60 0.64 0.63 0.65 
Sichuan 1.03 1.06 1.12 1.10 0.97 0.80 0.65 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.77 0.81 0.81 0.88 0.55 0.57 0.62 0.63 
Tianjin 2.79 2.78 1.81 1.89 2.15 1.79 1.56 1.79 1.28 1.18 1.12 1.22 1.36 1.46 0.69 0.66 0.70 0.73 
Tibet -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.08 
Xinjiang 0.25 0.11 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.56 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.45 
Yunnan 0.67 0.81 0.83 0.71 0.64 0.75 0.63 0.70 0.78 0.77 0.85 0.90 0.90 1.02 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.48 
Zhejiang 1.80 2.01 1.94 1.90 1.62 1.56 1.35 1.49 1.35 1.31 1.27 1.23 1.24 1.33 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.63 
National 
Average 
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Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Anhui 0.66 0.60 0.55 0.48 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.47 
Beijing 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.85 0.81 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.94 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.82 
Fujian 0.74 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.73 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.64 
Gansu 0.43 0.39 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 
Guangdong 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.85 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.73 
Guangxi 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.51 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.37 
Guizhou 0.49 0.43 0.42 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.38 
Hainan 0.61 0.64 0.61 0.55 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.51 
Hebei 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.47 
Heilongjiang 0.61 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.29 
Henan 0.64 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.44 
Hubei 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.49 
Hunan 0.57 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.44 
Jiangsu 0.70 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.88 0.84 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.83 
Jiangxi 0.55 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.49 
Jilin 0.49 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.38 
Liaoning 0.68 0.61 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.63 0.47 
Neimeng 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.46 
Ningxia 0.39 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.33 
Qinghai 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.18 
Shaanxi 0.56 0.52 0.42 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.47 
Shandong 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.67 
Shanghai 0.81 0.81 0.80 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.86 0.88 0.95 0.91 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.89 
Shanxi 0.63 0.59 0.51 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.55 0.64 0.57 0.57 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.48 
Sichuan 0.61 0.58 0.52 0.46 0.42 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 
Tianjin 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.79 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.83 
Tibet 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 
Xinjiang 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.35 
Yunnan 0.51 0.46 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.38 
Zhejiang 0.69 0.71 0.79 0.84 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.72 
National 
Average 
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